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NOTE
DUMPING THE PROBABLE CAUSE
REQUIREMENT: WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD DECIDE PROBABLE CAUSE IS NOT
NECESSARY FOR CELL TOWER DUMPS
I.

INTRODUCTION

With technology changing and improving as quickly as ever, it
stands to reason that the law is often behind the times, and regularly
needs to catch up.' This is precisely where the law currently stands
regarding cell phones.2 It seems as though cell phone technology
improves on a regular basis.3 These changes result in laws that are
outdated and a need for increased scrutiny by the courts. Estimates
suggest that in 2013, there were approximately 335.65 million wireless
subscriber connections.' Additionally, there were nearly 304,360 cell
towers in the United States.6 In 2012, Verizon Wireless received an
estimated 270,000 law enforcement requests for information about

1. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Courts, Rights, and New Technology: Judging in an Ever-Changing
World, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 261, 262-63 (2014); see also Caitlin Rice, Police In My Pocket:
The Need For Fourth Amendment ProtectionFor Cellular Telephone Tracking, CHAMPION, Nov.Dec. 2014, at 36, 36, 40 (discussing how the Supreme Court has not confronted the issue of whether
nonphysical surveillance, such as cellular GPS tracking, constitutes a search).
2. See Privacy, ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy (last visited
Sept. 2, 2015).
3. See James Kendrick, Mobile Technology: The Amazing Impact on Our Lives, ZDNET
(Apr. 30, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/mobile-technology-the-amazing-impact-on-ourlives-7000014679.
4. See Sutton, supranote 1, at 263-64.
5. Your Wireless Life: Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA WIRELESS
ASS'N, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey
(last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (explaining that wireless subscriber connections include the number of
active devices, such as smartphones, feature phones, and tablets, but because many users have more
than one device, this number is not reflective of the number of individual subscribers).
6. Id.
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customers' cell phone usage.7 Similarly, AT&T received 301,816
federal, state, and local criminal and civil investigation demands for cell
phone information.8
One of the most pressing cell phone-related issues involves a
practice known as "cell tower dumps." 9 Cell tower dumps have been
described as "a limited dragnet."'" When law enforcement requests cellsite location data, or a cell tower dump, they are requesting the
information on all calls transmitted through a cell tower at a given time,
on a given date, near a specific location." Cell tower dumps are
considered to be a subset of historical cell-site information. 2 This differs
from the more typical law enforcement requests for cell-site location
data, which involves the call information for a particular cell phone
number provided by law enforcement.1 3 When government officials

7. Letter from William B. Petersen, Gen. Counsel, Verizon Wireless, to Edward Markey,
Senator of Mass. 1 (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-1209 VZ CarrierResponse.pdf (dividing those requests into 135,000 for "subscriber information or
historical call detail records," and 30,000 for "location information and 'cell tower dumps').
Historical call detail information and subscriber information is information that is customarily
divulged on a customer's bill. Id.
8. AT&T Transparency Report, AT&T INC. 3-4, http://about.att.com/content/dam/csr/
PDFs/AT1 _Transparency%20ReportJan%202014.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (dividing the
requests AT&T fulfilled into 24,229 historical cell-site location information demands, 12,576 realtime cell-site location information demands, and 1,034 cell tower searches). Historical cell-site
location information allows law enforcement to get information about a person's past
communications and locations. Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable CauseIs
Necessary to Protect What's Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1875, 1884
(2011). Real-time cell-site location provides law enforcement with a person's approximate location
at that exact moment. Id.
9. See Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government's Use of
Cell Tower Dumps in ElectronicSurveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3-6 (2013) (describing how
cell tower dumps work); see also Ellen Nakashima, Agencies Collected Data on Americans'
Cellphone Use in Thousands of 'Tower Dumps,' WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2013, at Al.
10. Nate Anderson, How "Cell Tower Dumps" Caught the High County Bandits-and Why It
Matters, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/
how-cell-tower-dumps-caught-the-high-country-bandits-and-why-it-matters.
11. Nakashima, supra note 9; see also John Kelly, Cellphone Date Spying: It's Not Just the
NSA, USA TODAY (June 13, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-police/3902809. The practice of using cell tower dumps as an
investigatory technique has become so common that:
About one in four law-enforcement agencies have used a tactic known as a "tower
dump," which gives police data about the identity, activity, and location of any phone
that connects to the targeted cellphone towers over a set span of time, usually an hour or
two. A typical dump covers multiple towers, and wireless providers, and can net
information from thousand of phones.
See Kelly, supra.
12. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, at 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining the
difference between typical requests for historical cell-site information and cell tower dumps).
13. Peter A. Crusco, Cell Tower Dumps and the FourthAmendment, 251 N.Y.L.J. 5, 5 (2014).
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request a cell site info, they obtain a list of calls made to and from the
given telephone number, along with the location of the cell towers from
which the calls originated and terminated. 4 Generally, law enforcement
15
requests cell-site information for periods of thirty minutes or less.
In contrast, when law enforcement requests a cell tower dump, they16
generally do not know a targeted suspect's cell phone number.
Therefore, in order to identify a suspect, law enforcement must go
through the cell service provider records and determine all cell phone
numbers that are in the vicinity of the cell tower on the date and time in
question. 17 This data may generate additional evidence that could help
them find a suspect and establish probable cause.' 8 The records obtained
via cell tower dumps commonly let law enforcement know the
neighborhood the phone was located in when the call was placed and
when the call ended. 19 Thus, cell tower dumps can be an extremely
useful investigatory tool for crimes such as home invasions, robberies, or
sexual assaults.2 °
The forms of cell-site location data law enforcement can request are
real-time2' and historical. The distinctions between historical and real14.

Id.

15. Brief for ACLU at 6, In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. M50), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/5.20.2014 aclutower dumpbrief
tom.j._francis.pdf (explaining when the time requested exceeds thirty minutes, service providers
might request that law enforcement narrows the scope).
16. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5.
17. Owsley, supranote 9, at 6.
18. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing two cases where law enforcement used cell tower
dumps to establish probable cause); see also Jeff Stone, NYPD InvestigatingBrooklyn Bridge White
Flags Mystery with 'Invasive' Cell Tower Surveillance, Worrying PrivacyAdvocates, INT'L Bus.
TIMES (July 29, 2014, 3:32 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/nypd-investigating-brooklyn-bridgewhite-flags-mystery-invasive-cell-tower-surveillance-1642520 (discussing that cell tower dumps
proved to be particularly helpful in solving the murder of Imette St. Guillen when prosecutors used
data from a nearby cell tower to prove Daryl Littlejohn traveled from his home to the place where
the body was found).
19. Orin Kerr, The Eleventh Circuit'sNovel Approach to the FourthAmendment in the Davis
Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/19/the-eleventh-circuits-novel-approach-to-the-fourth-amendment-in-thedavis-case.
20. Owsley, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining how cell tower dumps are useful in these sorts of
"serial crimes" because law enforcement can "cross-reference for numbers that come up in all
locations"). Recently, the New York City Police Department used cell tower dumps to determine
who placed white flags on the Brooklyn Bridge. Stone, supra note 18. In Colorado, police caught
the "High Country Bandits" by using cell tower dumps to help solve a series of sixteen robberies.
Anderson, supra note 10.
21. Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court OrderedDisclosure of HistoricalCell Site Location
Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1745, 1748
(2009). Real-time cell-site location information allows law enforcement to obtain information about
a person's communications and locations "as it happens in real time." Id. Real-time cell-site
information is a branch of prospective cell-site information, referring to cell-site information "that is
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time cell-site location data are significant because the courts tend to treat
the expectation of privacy and level of protection needed differently
depending on the type of information being requested. 23 Since cell tower
dumps are a subset of historical cell-site location data, this Note will
focus more closely on the treatment of historical cell-site information by
the law and the courts. 24 Historical cell-site information allows law
enforcement to get information about a person's past communications
and locations. 25 Often, historical cell-site location data "involves using
historical call detail records [] to identify the location and pattern of
movements over time of relevant cell phones 1) within mapped radio
frequency [] areas, 2) relative to geographically-fixed cell towers, and 3)
at fixed points in time. '2 6 Historical call detail records provide precise
information regarding date, time, and location of a cell phone.27
Additionally, historical call detail records provide all incoming and
outgoing telephone numbers that connect with the cell tower, including
both voice calls and text messages. 28 These records provide how long
these connections lasted, as well as the cell towers that the cell phone
was connected to at the beginning and end of these connections.2 9

generated after the government has received court permission to acquire it." In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599
(D. Md. 2005). Further, real-time cell-site location information "would reveal the physical location
of the person in possession of the cell phone whenever the phone was on." Id. at 598. Some courts
have determined that real-time cell-site location information is akin to cell phone tracking and,
therefore, requires a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant. Id. at 604-05. Generally, realtime cell-site location information is considered to be "a more invasive search." Rice, supra note 1,
at 37.
22. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1884 (explaining that the distinction between real-time and
historical cell-site location information becomes important in light of the privacy interest of the
person targeted).
23. Rice, supra note 1, at 37.
24. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see infra Part III.B.
25. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1748.
26. Thomas A. O'Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal Trials,
U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL., Nov. 2011, at 16, 16 (2011).
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. Law enforcement requests historical cell data records because:
Cell tower and cell sector information for a particular cell phone is recorded in
[historical cell data records] CDRs at the time (1) a voice call is initially connected, (2) a
voice call is terminated, (3) a connection is made with the voice mail message service to
leave or retrieve a voice message, (4) a text message is sent, and (5) a text message is
delivered, which may be different than the time that the cell phone user reads the text
message.
Id.
29. Id.
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The practice of cell tower dumps raises the question of whether
they violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy and are,
therefore, a search under the Fourth Amendment. 30 The Supreme Court
has established a two-prong test to determine whether something is a
search under the Fourth Amendment: (1) does the person have an actual
expectation of privacy; and (2) is society prepared to recognize that
expectation of privacy as reasonable. 3'
The current court cases dealing with cell tower dumps focus on the
standard necessary to obtain cell tower dumps, but these court-imposed
standards are inconsistent and unclear.32 Some courts have determined
that law enforcement is required to show "specific and articulable
facts, 33 to conduct a cell tower dump, whereas other courts have
determined that cell tower dumps can only be obtained upon a showing
of probable cause.3 4 Adding to this confusion, many wireless service
providers require standards other than those required by statutes or the
courts. 35 To eliminate this confusion, the Supreme Court should establish
a bright line rule.36 The rule needs to provide law enforcement with a
clear guideline to follow for requesting cell tower dumps. 37 A specific

30. See Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. See Nakashima, supra note 9, at A9.
33. In re U.S. for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to
the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for Historical
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).
34. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014), affd 785 F.3d 498 (1 1th
Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also In re Application of the US.for HistoricalCell Site Data, 724 F.3d at
605-06.
35. See Letter from William B. Petersen to Edward Markey, supra note 7; AT&T
Transparency Report, supra note 8; Verizon's Transparency Reportfor the Second Half of 2014,
VERIZON WIRELESS, http://transparency.verizon.com/us-report?/us-data (last visited Sept. 2, 2015)
[hereinafter Verizon 's TransparencyReport]. Both Verizon and AT&T require law enforcement to
provide a warrant or a court order when requesting location information. AT&T Transparency
Report, supra note 8; Verizon 's TransparencyReport, supra. Verizon only requires that a judge sign
the warrant or court order. Letter from William B. Petersen to Edward Markey, supra note 7.
However, AT&T will only release location information upon a warrant or court order based on
probable cause. AT&T Transparency Report, supra note 8.When law enforcement can show an
emergency exists, Verizon and AT&T will provide cell tower information without a warrant or
court order. See Letter from William B. Petersen to Edward Markey, supra note 7; AT&T
Transparency Report, supra note 8. Verizon requires that law enforcement certify in writing that
"pursuant to federal law there was an emergency involving the danger of death or serious physical
injury that required disclosure without delay." Letter from William B. Petersen to Edward Markey,
supra note 7. AT&T also requires law enforcement certification that they are investigating a case
involving the risk of death or serious injury. AT&T TransparencyReport, supra note 8. Further,
AT&T specifies emergencies as being "kidnappings, missing person cases, attempted suicides, and
other emergencies." Id.
36. See infra Part V.A.
37. See infra Part IV.A.
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and articulable facts standard should 3 be
required in order for law
8
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This Note will begin by examining the current state of the law
concerning cell tower dumps and the Fourth Amendment by analyzing
the legislative initiatives and judicial interpretations pertaining to cell
tower dumps.39 Part II will examine current legislation and proposed
legislation on the subject of cell tower dumps.40 It will then examine
judicial jurisprudence regarding the Fourth Amendment and technology
in recent history.4' Part III will explore the problems with determining
the constitutionality of cell tower dumps under the Fourth Amendment,
including the lack of a consistent standard for obtaining cell tower
dumps and the problems for law enforcement in requiring probable
cause instead of specific and articulable facts.4 2 Subsequently, in Part IV,
this Note will argue that cell tower dumps do not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment and are, therefore, subject to a standard of
specific and articulable facts, a lesser standard than probable cause, in
order to provide some privacy protection to individuals.43
II.

CELL TOWER DUMPS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:

A BRIEF HISTORY
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which
governs searches and seizures, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
44

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Throughout history, the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with the question
of what is a search.45 Currently, there are no laws or Supreme Court
decisions that directly address the issue of whether cell tower dumps are
a search requiring probable cause.46 Subpart A will discuss the
38. See infra Part IV.A.
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Part H.A. 1-3.
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. See infra Part l.B.
46. See Owsley, supra note 9, at 2, 23 (explaining that there are no state or federal statutes
addressing cell tower dumps and there are very few state or federal court cases addressing
cell tower dumps); see also Press Release, Senator Edward Markey, For Second Year in a
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legislation that is used to obtain cell tower dumps.4 7 Subpart B will
discuss Supreme Court cases concerning technology and the reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. a8
A. Legislative Initiatives Used to Obtain Cell Tower Dumps
As technology advances, Congress has passed some legislation to
supply greater protections beyond those extended by the Fourth
Amendment. 49 That being said, Congress has done very little to deal
specifically with the issues created by cell tower dumps. 50 There are
laws in place dealing with cell phone technology in general, but there are
none that deal directly with cell tower dumps.5 First, the Electronics53
2
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")1 will be discussed below.
Next, this Note will investigate the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act ("CALEA"). 4 Finally, current proposed legislation on
the topic of cell tower dumps will be explored.55
1. Electronics Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA seeks to deal with technologically advanced forms of
communication, such as cell phones.5 6 The ECPA "was designed
to 'protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic

Row, Markey Investigation Reveals More than One Million Requests by Law Enforcement for
Americans Mobile Phone Data (Dec. 9, 2014), available at http://www.markey.senate.gov/
news/press-releases/for-second-year-in-a-row-markey-investigation-reveas-more-than-one-millionrequests-by-law-enforcement-for-americans-mobile-phone-data
(discussing Senator Edward
Markey's proposed legislation to protect American's cell-site location information).
47. See infra Part H.A.
48. See infra Part 11.B.
49. Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act:
Why Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to
Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 716 (2012). For example, Congress has passed the Electronics
Communications Privacy Act, which includes the Stored Communications Act. Id. In 1994,
Congress passed the Communications for Assistance of Law Enforcement Act, as well. Id. at 719.
50. See Press Release, Senator Edward Markey, supra note 46 (proposing legislation to curtail
law enforcement access to information obtained via cell tower dumps).
51. GINA STEVENS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, LEGAL STANDARD FOR
DISCLOSURE OF CELL-SITE INFORMATION (CSI) AND GEOLOCATION INFORMATION 1, 2 (2010).
There are four broad categories of surveillance in the area of electronic surveillance law: (1)
wiretaps; (2) tracking devices; (3) stored communications and subscriber records; and (4) pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2712, 3121-3127 (2012).
53. See infra Part I.A. 1.
54. 103 Pub. L. 414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994); see infra Part II.A.2.
55. See infra Part II.A.3.
56. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1894.
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communications.' 57 It protects all communications-wired, oral, or
electronic-while they are being made, are in transit, or are stored on a
computer. 58 The Stored Communications Act ("SCA") 59 and the Pen
Register Statute ("PRS") are components of the ECPA.6 °
The SCA details specific standards for law enforcement to obtain
electronically stored data.61 It governs law enforcement's right to use
"stored user account information compiled by third parties in the
ordinary course of business., 62 Congress's goal in passing the SCA was
to protect individual privacy interests as technology expanded.63 The
SCA only applies to wire or electronic communications. 64 A wire
communication is defined as "any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
'
Electronic communication is defined
origin and the point of reception. 65
as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
affects interstate commerce ....,,66 Since the information obtained via
cell tower dumps cannot be classified as a wire communication,67 the
SCA only governs cell tower dumps if they are classified as an
electronic communication.68
When law enforcement requests information, the SCA divides the
information sought into two mutually exclusive categories: (1) the
substance of the communications; and (2) the records or
subscriber/customer information. 69 However, the SCA does not allow

57. Owsley, supra note 9, at 13.
58. Elec. Commc 'nsPrivacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.SC.§ 2510-22, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (last updated July 30, 2013) [hereinafter
ECPA] (discussing that the ECPA is seen as an update on the Federal Wiretap Act--essentially, it
applied the same principles from the Wiretap Act to electronic and digital communications).
59. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
60. See ECPA, supranote 58; see generally §§ 3121-3127 (indicating the relevant sections of
the U.S. Code that make up the Pen Register Statute).
61. See § 2703 (citing the relevant portion of the SCA that applies to cell-site location
information); see also Elizabeth Elliot, Comment, United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully
Temporary) Derailment of Cell-Site Location Information Protection, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 19
(2013),

62.

Harkins, supra note 8, at 1896.

63.

Elliot, supra note 61, at 19.

64. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1757.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012).
66. See § 2510(12).
67.

See § 2510(1), (12).

68. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1757.
69. Id. at 1755-56.
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law enforcement to obtain records from a tracking device. 70 The main
purpose of the SCA is to standardize government access to stored
account information collected by a third party during the ordinary course
of business.7 1
Importantly, the SCA permits the gathering of electronic
communication records based on a showing of less than probable
cause. 2 Currently, law enforcement can obtain cell tower data with a
showing of specific and articulable facts. 73 The specific and articulable
facts must show that "there are reasonable grounds to believe the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation. 74 This places a lower burden on law enforcement than the
burden created by probable cause.7 5 The cell service provider must turn
the information over without being required to provide notice to the
subscriber or customer.76
The PRS, when first enacted in 1986, was narrowly defined.77
However, following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 78 the PRS

was expanded to apply to wire and electronic communications as well as
telephones. 79 It applies to two forms of telephone-based surveillance:80
(1) pen registers; 81 and (2) trap-and-trace devices. 82 The PRS also
70. Id. at 1757-58; see 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2012) (defining "tracking device" as "an electric
or mechanical device, which permits the tracking of the movements of a person or object").
71. Harkins, supranote 8, at 1896.
72. Owsley, supranote 9, at 14.
73. Elliot, supranote 61, at 3, 19.
74. § 2703(d).
75. Owsley, supranote 9, at 15.
76. Elliot, supra note 61, at 19.
77. James McClintick, Comment, Web Surfing in Chilly Waters: How The PatriotAct's
Amendments to the Pen Register Statute Burden Freedom of Inquiry, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 353, 359-60 (2005) (explaining that when the PRS was first enacted the law was clear
that law enforcement could only use pen registers to collect phone numbers dialed and sent over a
telephone line); see Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act, ACLU (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/surveillance-under-usa-patriot-act. Following the passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act the PRS was expanded to allow "nationwide pen register warrants" and to
allow "pen register searches [to be] applied to the Internet." Id.
78. H.R. 3162, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001); see also Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT
Act, supra note 77 (explaining that the USA PATRIOT Act expanded Fourth Amendment
exceptions "for spying that collects 'addressing' information about the origin and destination of
communications, as opposed to the content").
79. Malone, supranote 49, at 720.
80. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1754-55.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2014) (defining "pen registers" as "a device or process which
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication").
82. § 3127(4) (defining "trap-and-trace devices" as any "device or process which captures the
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requires law enforcement to obtain a court order prior to installing such a
device on a person's phone. In order to obtain a court order, law
enforcement officials must show that what they are requesting will be
"relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 84 Although pen registers
and trap-and-trace devices are often viewed as an archaic law
enforcement investigatory technique, as a result of advances in
technology, the PRS is still applicable to cell tower data because the
government sometimes makes the argument that it is entitled to
this information under the PRS.8 5 Furthermore, the PRS "serves as
the first watermark-the most permissive, purely legislative control over
a form of electronic8 6 surveillance that does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.,
2. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
Most recently, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA") 87 to aid law enforcement in
obtaining cell phone data.88 CALEA allows law enforcement officials to
obtain location information only if it is achieved by obtaining cell phone
numbers, precisely the function of a cell tower dump. 89 But, CALEA has
limited this assistance, preventing law enforcement from obtaining
location information under this law if it is attempting to obtain physical
location information pursuant to the PRS. 90 CALEA requires cell service
providers to guarantee that their equipment, facilities, and services allow
access to "call-identifying information"---"dialing or signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or
termination of each communication generated or received by a

incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing,
routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents
of any communication").
83. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1755.
84. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1895; see also § 3123(a)(1) (defining the standard of evidence
the government must satisfy to obtain a PRS court order).
85. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1895 (explaining that law enforcement will sometimes combine
the authority of the SCA, PRS, and CALEA when arguing they are entitled to cell tower dumps).
86. Id. at 1895-96.
87. 103 Pub. L. 414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
88. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1899 (noting that "Congress's stated objective in passing the
CALEA was to 'protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing
technologies').
89. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2014); Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1758.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2014) (explaining an exception in what sorts of information
law enforcement can get using CALEA); Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1758-59; Malone, supra
note 49, at 719.
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subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a
telecommunications
carrier." 91 Importantly, the call-identifying
information cannot include information that would divulge the physical
location of the customer, unless the location can be established
from a telephone number. 92 Since wire communication and electronic
communication are defined identically under CALEA and the
SCA,93 information from devices that are capable of tracking an
individual's movements are not considered electronic communications
under CALEA.94
3. Current Proposed Legislation
Recently, Senator Ed Markey 95 proposed new legislation that would
make it more difficult for law enforcement to obtain cell phone
information.9 6 Under Senator Markey's bill, law enforcement would

need a warrant to obtain Global Positioning System ("GPS") location
data.97 Additionally, the proposed legislation would limit cell service
providers in terms of how long they could keep customers' phone data,
and it would require law enforcement to disclose the nature and volume
of requests made of cell service providers.98
The proposed legislation would not, however, necessitate a warrant
for cell tower dumps. 99 Nevertheless, it would seek to restrain law

91. 103 Pub. L. 414, 108 Stat. 4279; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (defining call-identifying
information); Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1759.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B); Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1758-59. The relevant section
of the PRS states:
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers
and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of Title 18), such call-identifying
information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of
the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the
telephone number) ....

§ 1002(a)(2)(B).
93. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
94. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1759.
95. About Ed, ED MARKEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MASS., http://www.markey.senate.gov/about
(last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
96. Nakashima, supra note 9, at A8.
97. Id.; see also Press Release, Senator Edward Markey, supra note 46 (discussing that the
proposed legislation would "[r]equire location tracking authorization only with a warrant when
there is probable cause to believe it will uncover evidence of a crime" as is the same standard used
by law enforcement to search a home).
98. Nakashima, supra note 9, at A8; see also Press Release, Senator Edward Markey, supra
note 46 (explaining the proposed legislation would "[m]andate creation of rules by the Federal
Communications Commission to limit how long wireless carriers can retain consumers' personal
information").
99. Nakashima, supranote 9, at A8.
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enforcement's ability to obtain such information by requiring that
requests for cell tower dumps be more carefully modified.' 0 Further,
when the situation is an emergency, law enforcement authorities would
need to provide a signed, sworn statement after receiving the
information from a wireless service carrier to substantiate the request for
emergency access.l1l
B. Supreme Court Cases Pertainingto Technology andReasonable
Expectation of Privacy Under the FourthAmendment
To date, the Supreme Court has not decided whether cell tower
dumps constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 However, the
Supreme Court has dealt extensively with the Fourth Amendment and
what does constitute a search. 10 3 Below, this Part will examine the
Supreme Court case law regarding the Fourth Amendment and the
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine,
and how it specifically relates to telephone usage. 1°4 An analysis of
how the Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to
technology, from beepers to GPS tracking and cell phones,
advances in 05
will follow.'
1. The Beginning of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is based on the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. 0 6 This test was established in
1967 when the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States.'°7
However, following the its decisions in United States v. Miller 8 and
Smith v. Maryland,'0 9 the Court carved out some exceptions to the

100. Press Release, Senator Edward Markey, supra note 46 (explaining that the proposed
legislation would seek to "[c]urb bulk data information requests such as cell tower dumps that
capture information on a large group of mobile phone users at a particular period of time, and
require that any request be more narrowly tailored").
101. Id. (discussing that the proposed legislation would "[r]equire, in the case of emergency
circumstances, a signed, sworn statement from law enforcement authorities after receipt of
information from a carrier that justifies the need for emergency access").
102. Malone, supra note 49, at 704; Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth
Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless Use of GPS and Cell Phone
Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2010).
103. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See infra Part I.B.2-3.
106. Steven Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and
Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 556, 566 (2014).
107. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
108. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
109. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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reasonable expectation of privacy test-namely, assumption of the risk
via the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine.1 10
In Katz, the Supreme Court made the radical change in Fourth
Amendment doctrine to move from the Olmstead v. United States 1
trespass test' 12 to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 13 The Court
'1 14
held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
However, the majority decision failed to sum up how those people
would be protected and has become largely ignored." 5 Thus, the modem
reasonable expectation of privacy test comes from Justice Harlan's
concurrence: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'11 6 As a result of Katz, a
warrant supported by probable cause is required not only
for a physical
17
search, but also for electronically collected information. 1
The Supreme Court further defined Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in United States v. Miller." 8 In what has since become
known as the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine, the Court held the Fourth

110. Paul Ohm, The FourthAmendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1310, 132627 (2012).
111. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
112. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding the Fourth Amendment
only applied to physical searches where a trespass occurred). The Court determined that all the
previous case law regarding the Fourth Amendment held that "unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure," the Fourth
Amendment will not be violated. Id. In this case, the Supreme Court held that wire-tapping did not
constitute a search or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because there was no
physical trespass. Id; see Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy" Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2009).
113. See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection").
115. Id. at 359; see Winn, supra note 112, at6.
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Many lower courts began to cite to Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, and after a year, the Court began using Justice Harlan's reasonable
expectation of privacy test as the test for whether a search protected by the Fourth Amendment
exists. Winn, supra note 112, at 7. Furthermore, within the decade that ensued, Justice Harlan's test
had become so widely applied that the Supreme Court formally recognized it as the essence of Katz,
which meant that the concurrence essentially replaced the majority in applicability and precedential
value. Id.
117. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1888-89 (explaining that the Court left open to future decisions
to determine exactly what types of electronic information gathering would involve the Fourth
Amendment); see infra notes 118-63 (discussing Supreme Court cases where the Court has opined
on the applicability of the Katz doctrine to new forms of technology).
118. 425 U.S. 435,442-43 (1976).
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Amendment does not apply to financial transaction records." 9 The Court
reasoned that when a defendant "voluntarily conveys" the information
sought by the government to third-party banks, the defendant assumes
the risk of this information ending up in the hands of law enforcement. 2 "
The Third Party Disclosure Doctrine was further extended in Smith
v. Maryland.121 The Supreme Court held that the installation of a pen
register was not a Fourth Amendment search. 122 The Court reasoned that
since pen registers only collect the numbers dialed from particular
phones, they are minimally intrusive. 23 Most importantly, the Court
found that since law enforcement was not gaining access to the content
of the communications, but only the phone numbers dialed, pen registers
do not violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. 12 4 Rather,
the dialer assumed the risk that the telephone company will convey the
phone numbers dialed to the government, 12 ' and a person does not have
of privacy in the phone company's list of
a reasonable expectation
26
numbers dialed.1
119. Id. (discussing that all of the documents-including financial statements, deposit slips,
and checks-obtained by the government "contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business"). Additionally, the Court
argued that there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in checks, because checks are "not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions." Id.
at 442.
120. Id. at 443; see Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1762; see also Mark Daniel Langer, Note,
Rebuilding Bridges: Addressing The Problems of Historic Cell Site Location Information, 29
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 955, 961-62 (2014) (explaining that the Court reasoned that since the bank was
a party to the transaction then the bank was able to provide those records to the government).
121. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
122. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42, 745-46 (arguing that since pen registers have such limited
capabilities, they do not invade a persons reasonable expectation of privacy). Pen registers do not
even allow law enforcement to ascertain whether a communication occurred; they merely alert law
enforcement to when a phone number was dialed. Id. at 741.
123. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1762; see Marc C. McAllister, The Fourth Amendment
and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 480
(2012) (analogizing the use of a pen register to collect telephone numbers dialed to searching the
websites visited and e-mail addresses a person corresponds as both being minimally intrusive
because, "neither technology acquires the contents of the communication at issue; rather, each
technology reveals only the addressing information associated with the particular communication,
where expectations of privacy are arguably diminished").
124. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-43 (explaining that pen registers cannot hear sound, so law
enforcement does not obtain the content of any communications using pen registers); see also
Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1762-63 (discussing how it is unlikely that telephone users do not
know that they are conveying the telephone number dialed to the phone company and even if they
had an actual expectation of privacy it would not be reasonable because of the assumption of the
risk doctrine).
125. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; see Ohm, supra note 110, at 1326-27 (arguing that police power is
expanded as a result of the assumption of the risk doctrine, allowing police to access records
voluntarily conveyed to a third party without constitutional protections).
126. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (holding that a person generally lacks an actual expectation of

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/8

14

Regan: Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: Why the Supreme Court Sho

2015]

DUMPING THE PROBABLE CA USE REQUIREMENT

2. The Fourth Amendment and Advancing Technology
As technology advances, the Supreme Court has grappled with the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to new forms of technology.127
Advances in technology often come with new ways for the government
to invade an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 28 In United
States v. Knotts, 129 the Supreme Court refused to extend Fourth
Amendment protections when a beeper was used to track an individual
on public streets. 3 ° The importance of the ruling in Knotts is that the
Court exempted electronic surveillance from Fourth Amendment
could also be observed
protection when the information obtained
3
through traditional surveillance techniques.1 '
However, in United States v. Karo,132 the Court placed a significant
limitation on the holding of Knotts. 133 In that case, police obtained
information that could not have been achieved through visual
observation. 34 The Court held that when law enforcement uses tracking
devices to obtain information that would otherwise be shielded from the
public, a warrant supported by probable cause is required under the
Fourth Amendment. 135 When the holdings of Knotts and Karo
are combined they "establish a 'public/private dichotomy' that
governs the Fourth Amendment validity of law enforcement use of
tracking devices.' 36

privacy in the telephone numbers dialed and even if that person had an actual expectation of privacy
in the telephone numbers dialed, it would not be a legitimate expectation of privacy).
127. See infra notes 128-63 and accompanying text.
128. See Alex Kozinski & Eric S. Nguyen, Has Technology Killed the Fourth Amendment?,
2011-2012 CATO SUP.
CT. REv., 26, 27, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
serials/ files/supreme-court-review/2012/9/scr-2012-kozinski-nguyen.pdf (discussing the impact of
advancements in technology and the Fourth Amendment).
129. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
130. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (holding a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy on public streets); see also Marc C. McAlister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A
Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 215 (2014) (explaining the using the
beeper to track the defendant was not a Fourth Amendment search because "the beeper did not
provide any information police could not have obtained through visual surveillance along the
vehicle's route").
131. Harkins, supranote 8, at 1890.
132. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
133. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1765.
134. Karo, 468 U.S. at 707, 714; see McAlister, supra note 130, at 215-16 (discussing how the
Court in Karo reached the opposite result because the beeper was used to track the defendant's
movements inside a private residence).
135. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716 (reasoning that "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight"); Harkins, supra note 8, at
1890.
136. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1767.
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The Court further expanded Fourth Amendment protections in areas
of technological advancement in Kyllo v. United States.1 37 The Supreme
Court sought to protect individuals from governmental intrusion when
police used sensory enhancing technology, which was not available to
the general public, to gain access to parts of a home that could not be
seen without "physical intrusion."138 The Court articulated that the
surveillance conducted in this case was considered a search and was
unreasonable without a warrant. 139 Thus, the general rule regarding
is
advancing technology appears to be that, as long as the technology 140
accessible to the public, law enforcement can use it without a warrant.
As a result, law enforcement cannot use the latest technology, which
assures that citizens retain the "degree of privacy against the government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted," before the
invention of the new technology. 141
Recently, the Court was asked to determine whether prolonged
GPS tracking of a person's vehicle was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 142 In United States v. Jones,143 the Supreme
Courtheld that police physically trespassed onto private property
by putting a GPS on the car, and therefore the use of GPS tracking
was a search. 144 Following the Court's ruling, the Fourth
Amendment can be violated if it is shown that law
enforcement45 trespassed or violated a person's reasonable expectation
1

of privacy.

137. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
138. Id. at 34-35. Police suspected the defendant of growing marijuana in his home so they
used a thermal imager to detect heat levels. Id.at 29-30. Law enforcement officers scanned the
home from a vehicle across the street from the house and the scan only took a couple of minutes. Id
139. Id.at 34 (holding that where the information is obtained using "sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use").
140. Id. at 34-35 (explaining that the use of the thermal imager in this case was a search when
it was examined against the criteria discussed above); see Ohm, supra note 110, at 1328.
141. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (reasoning that the holding assured "preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted"); see Sutton,
supra note 1, at 267-68.
142. See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012). But see People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 2009) (applying a Mosaic Theory approach to determine if GPS
tracking was a search under the New York State Constitution). The court reasoned: "Here, we are
not presented with the use of a mere beeper to facilitate visual surveillance during a single trip. GPS
is a vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technology that is easily and
cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capability." Id.at
1199.
143. 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
144. Id.at 949.
145. Bellovin et al., supra note 106, at 569-70.
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As Justice Sotomayor points out in her concurrence, police used
GPS to track the defendant's movement for four weeks. 146 Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged that the trespass test cannot provide the
required direction for determining Fourth Amendment cases where new
forms of technology are involved. 147 She disagreed with the use of GPS
tracking for both long-term and short-term monitoring because it is
unique when she noted that "GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familiar, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations."1 48 Justice Sotomayor also argued that the Court
needs to reconsider the applicability of the Third Party Disclosure
Doctrine in the digital age because people expose a lot of private
information about themselves via technology. 149 Instead, she proposed
that the Mosaic Theory 50 should be applied in the digital age because if
the Court continues to follow the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine, the
government can get a whole picture of a person's life without any
restrictions. 15 1 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the Mosaic Theory
should cover a search where law enforcement learns details about a

146. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
147. Elliot, supranote 61, at 17.
148. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955; see Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth
Amendment: The Implications of Riley v. California, 2013-2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 317.
149. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957.
150. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying the
Mosaic Theory in deciding the lower court case Jones was appealed from); Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the FourthAmendment, 111 MICH. L. REv. 311, 320 (2012). The Mosaic Theory
necessitates that the Fourth Amendment search doctrine is applied to government actions in their
entirety, not just to the isolated steps. Kerr, supra. Rather than asking if a specific act is a search,
"the Mosaic Theory asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a
search when considered as a group." Id. In Maynard, the court determined that "[p]rolonged
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a
person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble." 615 F.3d at 562. This
information combined can reveal more about a person than any individual trip does in isolation. Id.;
Kerr, supra, at 326. The court reasoned that month-long surveillance of a person's movements,
which were not exposed to the public, is similar to a rap sheet because it reveals much more than
just the person's movements. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561-62. Further, the court felt that twenty-eight
days worth of surveillance was a search under the Fourth Amendment because it exposed an
intimate look into an individual's life that "he expects no one to have-short perhaps of his spouse."
Id. at 563. The problem is not the level of intrusion, but rather the kind of intrusion because "no
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and
a way of life" Id. at 562. The majority in Maynard suggests the Mosaic Theory should be applied
when the government search reveals "more than a stranger could have observed." See Kerr, supra,
at 330. Numerous nonsearches combined, become a search "because the individual pieces of the
puzzle that seemed small in isolation could be assembled together like a mosaic to reveal the full
picture of a person's life." Id. at 325.
151. See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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person's life "more or less at will," meaning that they
can access nearly
152
all facets of a person's life without her knowledge.
Justice Alito's concurrence calls for the application of Fourth
Amendment search restrictions when law enforcement conducts longterm GPS tracking of a suspect, but would not require a warrant for
short-term GPS tracking. 53 Applying the traditional Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test, he reasoned that the four weeks of GPS
monitoring conducted in this instance constituted a length of time that
violated the Fourth Amendment. 154 Justice Alito argued that the Mosaic
Theory should be applied to a search where "investigators collect and
' 55
analyze evidence in a way that would surprise members of society."'
The difficulty presented by Justice Alito's application of the Mosaic
Theory is that it provides relatively little guidance for law enforcement
and judges about when Fourth Amendment issues arise because
his application does
not examine what sorts of investigations might
56
society.
surprise
3. The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Technology
The Supreme Court recently recognized the need to address the
Fourth Amendment implications for cell phone technology.'5 7 In Riley v.
58
California,1
the Court reviewed two cases in which police searched

152. Kerr, supranote 150, at 330.
153. Id.at 327.
154. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
155. Kerr, supra note 150, at 330; see also Elec. Commc'ns Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part1):
Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Sec., and Investigations of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 105 (2013)
[hereinafter ECPA Hearing] (materials submitted by Representative Scott). When analyzing Justice
Alito's concurring opinion in Jones one scholar noted:
The Alito concurrence posits that 'relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable' while law enforcement secretly monitor[ing] and catalogu[ing]
every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period does not accord with
reasonable expectations of privacy.
ECPA Hearing,supra.
156. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 106 (explaining that the line of demarcation as to when
the GPS tracking became a search is unclear because while the Majority argues that four weeks was
"surely too long," Justice Alito believes the GPS tracking became a search before it reached the four
week mark, even though he never states specifically when he feels the GPS tracking became a
search).
157. See Pincus, supra note 148, at 321; see also Supreme Court Watch. Ten Key Issues
From the Riley Opinion Protecting Cell Phone Data Seized During an Arrest, FED. EVtD.
BLOG (June 30, 2014), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2014/June/supreme-court-watch-cell-phonecontent-protected-under-fourth-amendment.
158. 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).
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suspects' cell phones without warrants. 5 9 The Court held that before law
enforcement could search a person's cell phone, they must obtain a
warrant. 160 The majority opinion stated: "The sum of an individual's
private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled
with dates, locations, and descriptions.'' 6 1 Additionally, a person's cell
phone contains, in "digital form, many sensitive records previously
found in the home [and] it also contains a broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form-unless the phone [itself
was in the home].' 62 Therefore, in order to protect a person's privacy,
the Court required law63enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching
a person's cell phone.

159. Id. at 2480-82 (discussing the two cases, which were combined); Pincus, supra note 148,
at 321-22. In the first case, the defendant was stopped for driving with expired registration tags.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. He was arrested, and, during the search incident to arrest, police seized a
cell phone. Id. The officer went through the phone and noticed some language he took to mean the
defendant was a member of the Bloods, a notorious street gang. Id. At the police station, another
officer went through the phone and found a picture of the defendant standing in front of a car police
believed was involved in a shooting weeks earlier Id. at 2581. In the second case, police saw the
defendant making a drug deal. Id. Police arrested the defendant and seized two cell phones. Id.
While at the police station, one phone was repeatedly getting phone calls from "my house." Id.
Police opened the phone and saw a picture of a woman and baby as the phone's background. Id.
Police accessed the phone book and looked up the number associated with "my house" and were
able to use that to find the defendant's home address, which they subsequently searched and found
drugs, weapons, and money. Id.
160. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; see Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0 Rule Cellphone Search Needs a
Warrant,N.Y. TtMES, June 26, 2014, at Al (describing the significance of this decision with regards
to its likely impact on other forms of technology); see also John Schwartz, Cellphone Ruling Could
Alter Police Methods, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2014, at Al 8 (explaining that the message
from the Supreme Court to law enforcement is clearly to "get a warrant" when searching a cell
phone).
161. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489; see Adam Lamparello and Charles MacLean, Riley v.
California: The New Katz or Chimel?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
holding in Riley suggests the Court views "cellular telephones, particularly smartphones, along with
laptop computers and other digital devices, [as] the twenty-first century's private 'homes,' where
individuals store the 'papers and affects' traditionally accorded Fourth Amendment protection").
162. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491; see Pincus, supra note 148, at 325 (meaning that when police
search a cell phone they often have greater access to ordinarily unavailable personal information).
163. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; see Pincus, supra note 148, at 325 (explaining the Court
balanced the impact on a legitimate expectation of privacy with the effects of the search incident to
arrest exception determining "that the exception does not apply to digitally stored information
contained in a device seized in the course of an arrest" to reach the conclusion that a warrant was
necessary).
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PROBLEMS WITH DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CELL TOWER DUMPS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

In general, it is difficult to determine the constitutionality of
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 164 Advances in technology have
not made this an easier task. 165 As technology changes and improves,
questions of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy become
unclear. 66 In today's world, it is not uncommon for a person's cell
phone or computer to contain more private information than can be
found in the remainder of her home, because of the vast amount of
personal information that can be stored on a cell phone.1 67 This makes
the task of determining a concrete rule regarding the constitutionality of
cell tower dumps difficult for the legislature or the courts. 68 There are
several occasions where the use of cell tower dumps can be extremely
beneficial to law enforcement. 69 If they were required to obtain a
warrant before getting the data, valuable time would be lost. 170 Adopting
a probable cause standard for cell tower data, which is less precise than
GPS location data, would severely hamper law enforcement efforts. 7 '
Inconsistencies in cell tower legislation have led to confusion for
law enforcement.1 72 Below, this Part will explore the inconsistencies
created by the lower federal courts with regard to the standard necessary
to obtain cell tower dumps. 173 Furthermore, this Part will discuss the

164. See supra Part l.B.
165. See supra Part ll.B.
166. See Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 128, at 15-16 (discussing how technology has
changed the way the Fourth Amendment must be examined).
167. Riley, 134 S. Ct.at2491.
168. Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 128, at 16.
169. ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 20 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi). In one case in
particular, law enforcement used cell tower dumps in a robbery case in Rockland County, New
York. Id. There were seven bank robberies in the area and police were unable to find any suspects
until a witness-a victim in one of the robberies-showed them photographs of the suspect's car.
Id. Law enforcement obtained a subpoena and tried to figure out who purchased the car. Id. Law
enforcement then issued another subpoena for the basic subscriber information and phone
numbers-a cell tower dump. Id. Using the information from the cell tower dump, law enforcement
obtained a court ordered subpoena for historical cell-site location information. Id. Law enforcement
then used the information obtained from this to request a trap-and-trace pen register with location
authorization. Id. The information received from this device provided law enforcement with the
probable cause necessary to use GPS tracking, which ultimately resulted in the arrest of the robbery
suspects immediately after their next robbery. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See infra Part IHI.A.
173. See infra Part II.B.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/8

20

Regan: Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: Why the Supreme Court Sho

2015]

DUMPING THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT

officials by requiring
issues that would be created for law enforcement
174
them to show probable cause at this stage.
A. Lack of Clarity on What StandardIs Necessary to Obtain Cell
Tower Dumps Has Led to Inconsistenciesfor Law Enforcement
Since there is no legislation dealing directly with cell tower dumps,
law enforcement must rely on legislation dealing with cell phone
technology in general. 175 The inconsistent standards among the SCA, the
PRS, and CALEA have created confusion for law enforcement.176
Inconsistent decisions by the lower courts as to what standard is
necessary to obtain the information creates further confusion for law
enforcement regarding the constitutionality of cell tower dumps. 77 The
lower courts have interpreted the applicability of the various pieces of
legislation dealing with cell tower dumps differently and, as a result, law
enforcement does not have clear instruction of what is necessary to
obtain a cell tower dump. 78 Due to this lack of clarity, there is little
179
guidance on which law to apply when requesting cell tower dumps.
Law enforcement is left free to interpret the laws and court decisions in
whatever fashion they prefer to obtain the cell tower dumps.' 80
One of the greatest challenges for law enforcement seeking cell
18'
tower dumps is determining the appropriate legal standard to apply.
There is no legislation that directly addresses the legal standard
necessary to acquire cell tower dumps. 82 Law enforcement and the
174. See infra Part III.C.
175. Owsley, supra note 9, at 2, 43; see supra Part B.A.
176. See Harkins, supra note 8, at 1887 (explaining that the core of the dispute surrounding
what standard governs cell tower dumps is what statute governs the disclosure); see supra notes 7374 and accompanying text (discussing the SCA standard to obtain cell tower data); supra notes 8384 and accompanying text (discussing the PRS standard to obtain cell tower data); supra note 91
and accompanying text (discussing CALEA standard to obtain cell tower data).
177. ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 96 (explaining that the courts have created an
"inconsistent legal landscape" by reaching different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
cell tower dumps); see infra Part II.C.
178. See ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 96 (arguing that the system that has been created
"neither serves law enforcement needs nor protects privacy interests," because too much uncertainty
has been created); see infra Part III.C.
179. See Harkins, supra note 8, at 1887 (explaining the confusion created in the application of
the various statues typically used to obtain cell tower dumps); ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 96
(discussing the confusion lower federal courts have created regarding cell tower dumps); see supra
notes 175-78 and accompanying text; infra notes 180-209 and accompanying text.
180. See Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1768-69 (explaining that law enforcement created a
hybrid theory for obtaining cell-site information by combining the various standards from
legislation in order to convince the court to grant the order).
181. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 35 (statement of Catherine Crump).
182. Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.
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courts have interpreted the SCA, the PRS, and CALEA as being
applicable but have not agreed on how these statutes apply. 183 Adding to
this challenge is the fact that the SCA, the PRS, and CALEA all require
different standards to obtain cell tower dumps.' 84 The lack of clarity
among the various statutes used to obtain cell tower dumps results in law
85
enforcement using creative means to obtain the information they seek.1
Since the SCA is only applicable to wire or electronic
communications, and information obtained via cell tower dumps is not
classified as a wire communication, 186 the SCA can only govern cell
1 87
tower dumps if they are classified as an electronic communication.
The SCA protects information by: (1) "limit[ing] the government's
ability to compel private communications companies to disclose
information about subscribers;" and (2) "limit[ing] a private company's
ability to voluntarily turn over information about a subscriber to the
government. ' 188 Importantly, the SCA permits law enforcement to
gather electronic communication records based on a showing of less
than probable cause. 189 Currently, under the SCA, law enforcement
officials can obtain cell tower dumps with a showing of specific and
articulable facts.190
Law enforcement most frequently invokes section 2703(d) of the
SCA as its means of obtaining cell tower dumps.' 91 The provision is
generally considered a less stringent standard than is required to obtain a
warrant.192 SCA section 2703(d) provides:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) ...shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
of a wire of electronic communication, or the records or other
183. See infra Part HI.B.
184. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text; infra notes 185-209 and accompanying
text.

185. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing law enforcement's use of a
hybrid theory to obtain cell tower dumps).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2014) (defining "wire communications" as "any aural transfer made
in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception");
§ 2510(12) (defining "electronic communication" as "any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical
or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications"); Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1757.
187. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1757.
188. Malone, supra note 49, at 716-17.
189. Owsley, supranote 9, at 14.
190. See Elliot, supra note 61, at 3; see also Owsley, supranote 9, at 30.
191. Elliot, supranote 61, at 19.
192. Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1757.
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information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
93
investigation.
Confusion arises, however, because the SCA does not permit the
government to obtain information from a device that could be used to
track a person's movements, even if it is a form of electronic
communication. 194 Because a cell phone is capable of being used as a
tracking device, there is often a misunderstanding as to whether the
SCA's specific and articulable facts standard is applicable.1 95
The PRS requires law enforcement to obtain a court order prior to
installing a pen register or a trap-and-trace device on a person's
phone. 96 In order to obtain a court order to install such a device, the
PRS requires law enforcement to show that "the information likely to be
obtained.., is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."' 97 Law
enforcement seeks creative alternatives to obtain cell tower dumps by
indirectly applying the PRS.' 98 Additionally, following the USA
PATRIOT Act expansions of the PRS, the Fourth Amendment
exceptions "for spying that collects 'addressing' information about the
origin and destination of communications, as opposed to the content,"
were applied to cell tower dumps.1 99 Significantly, following the passage
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the government can gain access more easily
to records of the activities of private citizen's held by third parties.2 °0
CALEA provides law enforcement with the greatest success of
achieving their goal of obtaining a cell tower dump because it allows law
enforcement to obtain location information when all it gets is cell phone
numbers. 20 ' However, when law enforcement is seeking call-identifying
information solely pursuant to authority given under the PRS, the callidentifying information cannot include any information that could

193. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2014).
194. Chamberlain, supra note 21, 1758.
195. Id. at 1757-58; see also Owsley, supra note 9, at 30 (explaining that although § 2703(d) of
the SCA requires specific and articulable facts, a magistrate could require a showing of probable
cause if he or she feels it is necessary even when the information law enforcement officials are
requesting would not result in tracking a person via their cell phone, removing the solidity of the
§ 2703(d) standard).
196. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1755.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2014) (defining the standard of evidence the government must
satisfy to obtain a PRS court order); Harkins, supra note 8, at 1895.
198. Harkins, supra note 8, at 1901 (explaining how the government combines elements of the
SCA, the PRS, and CALEA to create a hybrid theory to obtain cell-site location information).
199. H.R. 3162, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 214; see Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act,
supranote 77.
200. Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOTAct, supra note 77.
201. Chamberlain, supra note 21, at 1758.
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disclose the physical location of the person. 202 Significantly, since "the
terms 'wire communication' and 'electronic communication' are defined
in the same way under CALEA as they are under SCA, communications
from devices that can be used to track an individual's
movements are not
20 3
'electronic communications' under CALEA.,
The competing nature of the various cell tower dump statutes
makes it relatively easy to see why law enforcement officials would seek
to acquire cell tower dumps using a hybrid theory.2 °4 In applying a
hybrid theory, government officials request the information sought using
the most favorable parts of the SCA, the PRS, and CALEA.20 5 In effect,
law enforcement officials create their own "law" that is tailor-made and
under which they can have nearly unlimited access to cell tower
dumps.20 6 When the government seeks to obtain a cell tower dump using
the hybrid theory
[t]he statutory argument [it] claim[s is] that the [PRS] permits the
capture of numbers for incoming and outgoing calls, and that when
used on cellular phones these devices would also disclose [location
information] at the beginning and end of each call. Next, the
government cite[s] CALEA as requiring that the courts rely also on
some additional statutory authority when ordering the disclosure of
[real-time] cell-site information under the [PRS], and20 7contend[s] that
this additional authority was provided under the SCA.
In essence, this hybrid theory makes it much easier for the government
to get information using cell tower dumps because it has applied the
most favorable parts of the cell tower statutes, which means that it can
obtain this information under the lower standard of specific and
articulable facts. 20 8 However, the government has had little success in
applying this hybrid theory, mainly because courts view it as an
unwarranted reading of the applicable statutes.20 9

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Malone, supra note 49, at 719.
Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1759.
Harkins, supra note 8, at 1895, 1901.
Id.at 1901.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Chamberlain, supranote 21, at 1768-69.
Id.at 1769-73.
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B. Lack of Clarityfrom Lower Federal Courts on What StandardIs
Necessary to Obtain Cell Tower Dumps Has Led to
Inconsistenciesfor Law Enforcement
The lower federal courts appear to be somewhat unpredictable on
the standard they will indicate is necessary to obtain a court order to
conduct a cell tower dump. 210 Some lower federal courts have applied
the SCA § 2703(d) specific and articulable facts standard, whereas
others have determined probable cause is necessary to obtain a warrant
for cell tower dumps under the Fourth Amendment. 21 1 This has created
confusion for law enforcement seeking cell tower dumps.2 12
Several lower federal courts have held that the specific and
articulable facts standard of SCA § 2703(d) is the correct standard to be
applied when deciding whether or not to grant a subpoena for cell-site
location data.2 13 The Third Circuit held specific and articulable facts
means that law enforcement must show "that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. 2 14 The court
examined the legislative history, determining that neither the SCA itself
nor its legislative history dictates that the government must show
probable cause to obtain cell-site location data.215
In a recent case decided on the issue, a district court judge in New
York held that a warrant was not required because the information
requested-the telephone numbers-were voluntarily disclosed, and
thus, the information did not implicate the same privacy concerns as
would be generated if the content of the communications was sought.216
210. See infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts which support the
specific and articulable facts standard), notes 227-30 (discussing lower courts which support the
probable cause standard).
212. See infra Part III.C.
213. In re U.S. for an Order Directing Provider ofElec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to
the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding the government could obtain cell-site
information using 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which does not require probable cause); In re United States,
42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 512-14, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding all that was needed was an order
under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(d) and that cell tower dumps were not a Fourth Amendment search because
of the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine); In re U.S. Orders Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), 509 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 81-82 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'd, 509 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding the only
standard necessary is that the request be supported by "specific and articulable facts").
214. In re US. for an Order DirectingProvider of Elec. Commc 'n Serv. to Disclose Records to
the Gov't, 620 F.3d at 313; see also Owsley, supra note 9, at 30 (explaining that the Third Circuit
leaves to the discretion of the magistrate whether or not to require probable cause).
215. In re US. for an Order DirectingProviderof Elec. Commc 'n Serv. to Disclose Records to
the Gov't., 620 F.3d at 315.
216. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (requiring the government to amend their
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The district court determined that cell tower dumps do not violate a
person's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures so they do not require a warrant.21 7 The opinion stated that
law enforcement wanted phone numbers used during a given period, in a
given location, which were to be cross-referenced with other information
law enforcement had gathered throughout the investigation. 218 Therefore,
cell tower dumps do not afford the Government the possibility of
tracking people as a result of the authorization of a cell tower dump.21
Furthermore, the court applied the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine,
stating that subscribers are aware that the use of a cell phone necessitates
the disclosure of the information sought via cell tower dumps. 22 0 The
court concluded that although some government searches of voluntarily
disclosed information might be so invasive that a showing of probable
cause would be required, the case of cell tower dumps is not one of those
cases. 22 1 This is because "the telephone numbers associated with the
communications in a general location do not implicate privacy interests
to the same degree as... the content of those communications. 222
In another recent case regarding cell tower dumps, a magistrate
judge in Texas granted an order compelling a cell tower dump using the
SCA.223 Law enforcement requested "seven different cell phone service
providers to release historical cell tower data for specific towers
providing service to a crime scene within Houston city limits at the hour
of the crime. 224 Law enforcement did not specify a phone number or
specific identity of a suspect they were targeting.225 The district court
reasoned the SCA § 2701(d) standard of specific and articulable facts
was properly applied in this case and authorized the cell tower dump.22 6
Alternatively, a number of lower federal courts held that in order to
request historical cell-site location data law enforcement must show
request to "(1) provide[ ] more specific justification for the time period for which the records will be
gathered and (2) outline a protocol to address how the Government will handle the private
information of innocent third-parties whose data is retrieved").
217. Mark Hamblett, After Seeking ACLU Views, Judge Approves 'Cell Tower Dump,' 251
N.Y. L.J. 1,1(2014).
218. In re UnitedStates, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 515.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 517-18.
221. Id. at 519.
222. Hamblett, supranote 217, at 6.
223. In re Application for Cell Tower Records Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No. H-15-136M,
2015 WL 1022018, at *1 (S.D. Tex. March 9, 2015).
224. Id.
225. Id. (explaining it was the hope of law enforcement that by using the cell tower data a
suspect could be identified and arrested).
226. Id. at *4-5 (holding the only restriction placed on law enforcement's request was to limit
the temporal scope from one hour to ten minutes).
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probable cause.227 Although not all courts held a warrant was necessary,
they have determined that a court order to obtain such information
would not be granted without a showing of probable cause. 2 28 In one
case a court held that "existing Fourth Amendment doctrine must be
interpreted so as to afford constitutional protection to the cumulative
cell-site location records requested here., 229 The court reasoned that if it
were to apply the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine to cumulative cell-site
location data it would allow law enforcement to intrude into information
"objectively recognized as highly private. 23 °
C. Problemsfor Law Enforcement in Requiring
ProbableCausefor Cell Tower Dumps
There can be little argument that the use of cell tower dumps
231
provides a helpful and efficient investigative tool for law enforcement.
One law enforcement officer explained: "Geolocation information is an
essential building block in 'the construction' of a criminal
investigation.' 232 The problem with requiring probable cause for cell
227. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2701(d), 964 F.
Supp. 2d 674, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that the government needed a warrant for the
information requested and that they did not have sufficient evidence of probable cause to support
the granting of the warrant); In re Search of Cellular Tel. Towers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770-71
(S.D. Tex. 2013) (granting the warrant to obtain information as a result of cell tower dumps because
it was supported by probable cause); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) Directing Providers to Provide Historical Cell Site Location Records, 930 F. Supp.
2d 698, 701 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (denying the order because the statute relied upon by the government
did not address cell tower dumps and cell tower dump records can only be obtained with a showing
of probable cause); In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809
F. Supp. 2d 113,127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying the government's application because people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term cell-site location records).
228. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp.
2d 578, 596 (E.D.N.Y 2010) (denying the government's request for historical cell-site location data
because the court held probable cause was required under the Fourth Amendment); In re U.S. ex rel.
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836-40, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (using Karo and
Maynard, the court denied the government's request for cell-site information because the
government failed to show the location of the user was voluntarily conveyed in the data requested);
In re Application of the U.S., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583-84 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (holding the cell
phones were tracking devices and, therefore, cell-site location information constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment).
229. In re US.for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp.
2d at 127.
230. Id.at 126; see also United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014), aff'd
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that obtaining a cell tower dump under the SCA
was not a search, and that, even if it was, obtaining the cell phone records without a warrant was
reasonable).
231. Owsley, supra note 9, at 23 (calling cell tower dumps "a valuable weapon in law
enforcement's arsenal").
232. ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 27 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
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tower dumps is that when law enforcement seeks to conduct a cell tower
dump, they do not have a suspect they are targeting. 233 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") commonly uses cell tower dumps in the
early stages of robbery investigations to help identify suspects. 4 In the
first case where the FBI used a cell tower dump to find bank robbers,
FBI Agents used cell tower dump records that corresponded with the
area and time of nearly a dozen bank robberies committed by the
"Scarecrow Bandits., 235 The records showed two of the suspected
Scarecrow Bandits' cell phones connected to cell towers in the vicinity
of the bank robberies at or around the time they were committed.2 36 The
FBI used the cell tower dump records to link the cell phones of two of
the defendants to other members of the Scarecrow Bandits group whose
cell phones were also linked to cell towers near the robbery locations. 7
Once the FBI identified suspects in the bank robberies, they were able to
focus their investigation on these individuals allowing the FBI to
conduct visual surveillance to prevent future bank robberies.23 8 In
another bank robbery case, the FBI used cell tower dumps to arrest the
"High Country Bandits., 239 The FBI received information from a
witness at one of the bank robberies that a couple of hours before the
robbery occurred, a suspicious looking man was outside the bank talking
on a cell phone. 240 Using this tip, the FBI sought to get a cell tower
dump to identify a common cell phone number near all of the bank
robberies.24 ' In this case, "the FBI asked a federal magistrate judge to
approve four of these cell tower dumps [in the] four most rural [robbery]
locations in order to minimize the amount of extraneous telephone data
that would likely be obtained., 242 Agents obtained over 150,000
telephone numbers, which they cross-referenced to find common
numbers at the crime scenes.243 These cases illustrate that law
233. Id. at 22 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi); Crusco, supra note 13, at 5.
234. See United States v. Duffey, No. 3:08-CR-0167-B, 2009 WL 2356156, at *1 (N.D. Texas
July 30, 2009); see also Anderson, supra note 10.
235. Duffey, 2009 WL 2356156, at *1; see also Owsley, supra note 9, at 25 (explaining that the
Scarecrow Bandits were a group of armed robbers that "violently robbed more than twenty banks in
the Dallas area").
236. Duffey, 2009 WL 2356156, at * 1; see also Owsley, supra note 9, at 25.
237. Brian L. Owsley, Cops and Robbers: The Use of Cell Tower Dumps to
Investigate Bank Robberies, AM. CRIM. L. REv. BLOG: MENS REA, (Jan. 26, 2013),
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/cops-and-robbers-use-cell-tower-dumpsinvestigate-bank-robberies.
238. Duffey, 2009 WL2356156, at *2.
239. Anderson, supra note 10.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Owsley, supra note 9, at 27. The judge dismissed the defendant's argument that a cell

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/8

28

Regan: Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: Why the Supreme Court Sho

2015]

DUMPING THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT

enforcement uses cell tower dump data to help establish probable cause
of an investigation when they have little evidence to go
at the beginning
244
off of.
Another example of the effectiveness of cell tower dumps as an
investigative tool is that it now takes U.S. Marshalls only two days to
find a fugitive, compared to the forty-two days it used to take. 245 The
Associate Deputy Attorney General told a Senate Committee that "if an
amendment [to the ECPA] were to unduly restrict the ability of law
enforcement to quickly and efficiently determine the general location of
a terrorist, kidnapper, child predator, computer hacker, or other
dangerous criminal, it would have a very real and very human cost. ' ' 246 It
is the opinion of Peter Modaferri, Chief of Detectives at the Rockland
County, New York, District Attorney's Office, that "[r]equiring probable
cause to get basic, limited information about a person's historical
location would make it significantly more difficult to solve crimes and
seek justice. 247
IV.

THE SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS STANDARD SHOULD BE
UNIVERSALLY APPLIED TO CELL TOWER DUMPS

Cell tower dumps are not considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment.24 8 Since law enforcement acquires only a suspect's cell
phone number, no search is conducted, and therefore, no Fourth
Amendment right is hindered. 249 Further, when law enforcement
requests a cell tower dump, it does not have a specific suspect it is
targeting. 250 Therefore, law enforcement should not be subjected to a
required showing of probable cause and should not need to obtain a
warrant before obtaining information via cell tower dumps, because such
requirements would be unduly restrictive.25t Cell tower dumps are
conducted in the beginning stages of an investigation when law
enforcement is trying to establish probable cause; therefore, requiring
phone tracks location, responding: "[lit's a cell phone that's transmitting its location by the action
of everybody who has a cell phone." Id. at 28-29 (citing Transcript of Hearing at 23, United States
v. Capito (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (No. 3:10-CR-8050)).
244. See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
245. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 76 (materials submitted by the Hon. Robert C. Scott).
246. Id. at 79 (materials submitted by the Hon. Robert C. Scott).
247. Id. at 28 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
248. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding cell tower
dumps were not a Fourth Amendment search because of the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine).
249. Owsley, supra note 9, at 16.
250. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5.
251. See In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 519-20 (holding that an order under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(d) was all that was needed, which does not require probable cause).
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probable cause to conduct a cell tower dump would be impractical.25 2 A
major reason why cell tower dumps are not considered a search under
the Fourth Amendment is that they do not provide such specific
locations as to violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.2 53
Instead, cell tower dumps provide only an approximate location of the
cell phone, which, in turn, requires law enforcement to do more
investigating to determine the exact location of the cell phone.2 54
Therefore, law enforcement should be able to obtain information from
cell tower dumps without showing probable cause because cell tower
dumps are not a Fourth Amendment search.255 The U.S. Supreme Court
must establish a bright line rule in order to clear up confusion for law
enforcement regarding the standard necessary to obtain cell tower
dumps.2 5 6 It is important to understand the application of the Third Party
Disclosure Doctrine to cell tower dumps. 257 Below, this Part will argue
that the Mosaic Theory should not be applied to cell tower dumps.2 58

252. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 19 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
253. Compare In re U.S. for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 311 (3d Cir. 2010) (arguing that cell tower dumps do not
provide precise location data as would be available with GPS tracking), with Benjamin Burnham,
Comment, Hitching a Ride: Every Time You Take a Drive, The Government Is Riding with You, 39
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1499, 1506 (2006) (explaining how E-ZPass records provide police with
much more accurate and precise location data).
254. CompareIn re US. for an Order DirectingProviderof Elec. Commc 'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d at 311 (explaining that cell tower dumps only provide an
approximate location, requiring law enforcement to do more work to draw connections), with
Burnham, supra note 253, at 1506 (arguing that "EZ-Pass is basically [] enabling a tracking system"
because the location data is so precise).
255. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 519-20 (holding cell tower dumps were not a Fourth
Amendment search).
256. ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 20 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi) (arguing that cell
tower dumps provide the building blocks of law enforcement investigations); Langer, supra note
120, at 972 (explaining a Supreme Court decision on the issue of cell-site information is a possible
solution to the issue); see infra Part IV.A; see also supra Part ILI.A-B (illustrating the confusion
created by the lack of clarity in the law and in the courts regarding the standard necessary to obtain
cell tower dumps); supra Part HLI.C (discussing the problems that requiring probable cause to obtain
cell tower dumps would create for law enforcement).
257. See In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 519-20 (holding cell tower dumps were not a
Fourth Amendment search because of the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine); infra Part 1V.B.
258. See Evan Bemick, Protecting American's Privacy: Why the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act Should Be Amended, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM 1, 6 (2014),
http://thfmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LMI 18.pdf (arguing that the Mosaic Theory provides
more Fourth Amendment protection than the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine does, but that the
Mosaic Theory does not provide clear guidelines for law enforcement and the courts); infra
Part IV.C.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/8

30

Regan: Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: Why the Supreme Court Sho

2015]

DUMPING THE PROBABLE CA USE REQUIREMENT

A. A Bright Line Rule Should Be Establishedto Clear Up Law
Enforcement's Confusion Regardingthe StandardNecessary to
Obtain Cell Tower Dumps
Even though cell tower dumps do not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search, the Supreme Court should establish that the specific
and articulable facts standard be universally applied to cell tower dumps
in the interest of providing some protection.2 5 9 This ensures that law
enforcement has some basis as to why the information received after a
cell tower dump would be helpful, and protects individuals against law
enforcement requesting cell towers dumps for no reason. 260 At the same
time, the specific and articulable facts standard would be less restrictive
and require a lesser showing than probable cause, making it easier for
law enforcement in the initial stages of an investigation to gather the
information necessary to establish probable cause. 261 Further, Senator
Markey's proposed legislation on cell tower dumps would not require a
warrant to conduct cell tower dumps, suggesting that Congress does not
believe a warrant supported by probable cause is necessary.262 All that
the proposed legislation would seek to do is restrain law enforcement's
access to cell tower dumps by requiring that the requests are more
carefully modified, so as to protect those who are not involved in the
crime under investigation, but whose cell phones were connected to the
tower in question, which can be done by requiring specific and
articulable facts.263
Requiring probable cause at such an early stage in investigations
would make solving crimes unnecessarily difficult. 264 In particular,
because cell tower dumps are requested with no suspect in mind, cell
tower dumps constitute an invaluable investigatory tool used by law
enforcement. 265 During the beginning stages of an investigation, law
259. ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 20 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi) (arguing that
requiring probable cause for such basic and limited information would make it much more difficult
for law enforcement to solve crimes).
260. Id. (arguing that there needs to be a balance between the standards to access cell tower
dumps and the investigatory benefits for law enforcement in using cell tower dumps).
261. Id. at 26 (arguing that "[i]nvestigations don't start with probable cause; they lead to
probable cause"); see also id. at 16-17 (statement of Mark Eckenwiler) (explaining cell tower
dumps have the potential to revel vast amounts of innocent bystander information so some privacy
protection should be afforded, even though Mr. Eckenwiler does not suggest how to do this).
262. Nakashima, supra note 9, at Al; see supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining
the privacy protections a district court judge required the government to include along with the
specific and articulable facts to establish why the cell tower dump was necessary).
263. See supranote 100 and accompanying text.
264. ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 19 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi); see supra
Part III.C.
265. ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 19 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
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enforcement often has little information regarding potential suspects.266
The use of information attained following a cell tower dump allows law
enforcement to "winnow out and prioritize leads from the unorganized
mass of related and unrelated information that surrounds a crime and a
crime scene. 26 7
Additionally, with cell tower dumps, law enforcement is generally
not looking into a specific cell phone number or user.268 Rather, it is
looking into the cell phones in a given area, at a given time, on a given
date.269 When law enforcement seeks to use cell tower dumps it is using
this technique to help it identify cell phones that are used near a specific
location on a certain day at a given time. 270 Essentially law enforcement
is starting with nothing and uses the information provided in the cell
tower dump as the building block of their investigation. 271 When a cell
tower dump is requested, all law enforcement generally obtains is cell
phone numbers and basic customer information including names and
billing information.272 However, law enforcement does not get an exact
location of a person's cell phone.273
In addition to providing law enforcement with important
information during the early stages of an investigation, cell tower dumps
are not as invasive to a person's privacy as other forms of cell-site
location data.274 Cell tower dumps do not provide an exact location for a
cell phone and its user. 275 Instead, cell towers dumps indicate which cell
tower was used during cellular communication.2 76 Cell tower dumps
provide information more beneficial for cell service providers to manage
their networks than to provide law enforcement with tracking
capabilities.277 Cell tower data is less precise and less intrusive than
other forms of cell phone technology, such as GPS or real-time cell-site
location data, making a warrant unnecessary.2 78
266. Id. at 23.
267. Id.
268.

Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.

269. Id.
270. Id.
271.
272.
273.
274.

ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 19 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
Nakashima, supranote 9, at Al, A8.
Owsley, supra note 9, at 6.
See supra note 21 (explaining how real-time cell-site location information essentially

allows law enforcement to track a person's cell phone in real time).
275. Owsley, supra note 9, at 6.
276. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 6 (testimony of Mark Eckenwiler).
277. Douglas Starr, What Your Cell Phone Can't Tell the Police, NEW YORKER (June 26,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-your-cell-phone-cant-tell-the-police.
278. Ellen Nakashima, To Obtain Cellphone Location Records, Warrant Is Needed
Says Federal Appeals Court, WASH. POST (June 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/to-obtain-cellphone-location-records-warrant-is-needed-says-federal-
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Cell tower data is also less invasive or precise than the data law
enforcement officials obtain when they use E-ZPass records in the
course of their investigation. 279 When law enforcement officials request
E-ZPass records, they are only required get a subpoena, which does not
require a showing of probable cause. 280 E-ZPass records are essentially a
tracking system, because each time an E-ZPass user travels through a
tollbooth, the date, time, and tollbooth location is transmitted to a central
computer. 281 This provides law enforcement with an exact historical
location of a person, allowing them to track that person's movements.2 82
However, cell tower dumps merely provide law enforcement with an
approximate location of a person's cell phone.283 Therefore, it would be
illogical to require a warrant supported by probable cause for cell tower
dumps, where law enforcement only gets a list of phone numbers, when
only a subpoena is required for E-ZPass records, which essentially
provides law enforcement with tracking information. 284 E-ZPass, like
cell tower dumps, is an innovative technological practice used by those
E-ZPass users who have chosen to trade privacy for convenience. 85
Since Katz is primarily concerned with privacy, when "people choose to
capitalize on the convenience of E-ZPass even though they know it
creates a record of their toll crossings, then Katz will not protect
them., 286 If the Supreme Court were not to allow law enforcement to
utilize these new innovations, the Court would essentially "confine law
enforcement to primitive means for detecting and investigating evidence
of crime. 287
Cell tower dumps can be used to confirm whether or not that
suspect was actually at the scene.288 Law enforcement can confirm or
dismiss alibi statements of the suspect claiming not to be near the scene

appeals-court/2014/06/11/a21a73a2-flab-lle3-914c-lfbd0614e2d4_story.html; see also Crusco,
supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that courts have determined cell phone pinging does not require a
warrant despite the greater accuracy in tracking the cell phone users location).
279. Owsley, supra note 9, at 6; Burnham, supra note 253, at 1506.
280. Burnham, supranote 253, at 1506.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Owsley, supra note 9, at 6.
284. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5; see also Bumham, supranote 253, at 1506.
285. Christopher Caldwell, A Pass on Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 13, 13;
see also R "Ray" Wang, Beware Trading Privacyfor Convenience, HARv. BUS. REV. (June 10,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/06/beware-trading-privacy-for-con.
286. Erin Murphy, Term Paper, Back to The Future: The Curious Case of United States v.
Jones, 10 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. 325, 335 (2012).
287. Burnham, supranote 253, at 1512.
288. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 23 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1189

of the crime at the time the crime was committed. 289 Further, law
enforcement can confirm witness statements that a particular person was
involved in the crime by cross checking the information received via a
cell tower dump.2 90 The use of cell tower dumps can protect potential
suspects from wrongful arrests because cell tower dumps provide a more
accurate picture of who was in the vicinity of a crime scene at the time
the crime was committed.29' Wrongful arrests often result when police

are unable to conduct adequate investigations, but allowing cell tower
dumps to be used without requiring probable cause will allow law
enforcement to conduct more complete investigations.292 In particular,
cell tower dumps provide law enforcement with crucial information at
the critical early stages of an investigation where mistakes are more
likely to occur.293 The information obtained via cell tower dumps is an
essential element of helping law enforcement establish probable
cause. 294 Therefore, it would be unduly restrictive to require a showing
of probable cause before the information could even be obtained.29 5
B. The Third PartyDisclosureDoctrineApplies to Cell Tower Dumps,
Making Them a Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Cell tower dumps cannot violate a person's reasonable expectation
of privacy because individuals voluntarily disclose their cell phone
information to cell service providers, thus falling outside the protected
zone of privacy.296 Cell tower dumps should not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search because they are a form of business records

289. Id. (discussing the utility of cell tower dump data to confirm or dismiss an alibi statement
by seeing if the suspects phone was at the crime scene).
290. Id. (illustrating the utility of cell tower dump data to confirm or dismiss witness
statements that they were at the crime scene).
291. Id. at 19 (arguing that mistaken identifications are the primary cause of wrongful
convictions and using cell tower dump data can help prevent this by confirming the suspect was
actually at the crime scene).
292. Id. at 24. Preventing wrongful convictions begins at the crime scene because there "cannot
be a wrongful conviction without a wrongful arrest." Id. Wrongful arrests result when law
enforcement believes it has solid evidence but that proof is not concrete. Id.
293. Id. (arguing cell tower data is "tremendous[ly] factual data that can be used to remedy
these failures").
294. Id. at 24, 26.
295. Id.
296. See In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the Third
Party Disclosure Doctrine, the court determined cell tower dumps are not a Fourth Amendment
search); Hamblett, supra note 217, at 6.
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voluntarily conveyed to a third party.2 97 E-ZPass technology, like cell
phone technology, has been heralded as an innovation where the user
trades some privacy for convenience.298 Some would argue that the
unrestrained access to this information would be contrary to the core
values of the Fourth Amendment. 299 However, E-ZPass records, like cell
tower dumps, are business records and are, therefore, exempt from
Fourth Amendment restrictions.300 Because E-ZPass users elect to use
the system as a way of making travel faster, they are voluntarily
conveying their location information to E-ZPass. 30 1 This is the same
as when cell phone users make a phone call, connecting to a cell tower,
as they are voluntarily conveying this information to the cell
service provider.30 2 Therefore, the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine
protects both E-ZPass records and cell tower dumps from Fourth
Amendment restrictions.30 3
Further, the Obama Administration argued that Americans do not
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location while using a
cell phone, citing the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine as the authority
for this assertion. 304 Additionally, lower courts held that, under the
existing law, a cell phone user lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy
in information obtained via cell tower dumps. 305 Based on clear Supreme
Court precedent, lower courts have determined the Third Party
Disclosure Doctrine is applicable to cell tower historical cell-site
location data--of which cell tower dumps are a subset-because "[a]s
part of the ordinary course of business, cellular phone companies collect
information that identifies the cell towers through which a person's calls
are routed.,

306

Since the customer gives the information obtained through the use
of cell tower dumps to the phone company, the information is not
297. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979) (holding the Third Party Disclosure
Doctrine extended to telephone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)
(holding information voluntarily conveyed to a third party was beyond the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections).
298. Caldwell, supranote 285, at 13; see Wang, supra note 285.
299. Murphy, supranote 286, at 326.
300. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 519; ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 19
(statement of Peter A. Modafferi); see Murphy, supra note 286, at 335.
301. Burnham, supranote 253, at 1506; Murphy, supra note 286, at 335.
302. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 517-18.
303. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435,443 (1976).
304. Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET NEWS (Feb. 11,
2010, 4:00 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20140209075310/http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_310451518-38.html.
305. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 2d 129, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
306. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012).
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afforded Fourth Amendment protections. °7 Customers are voluntarily
disclosing information regarding their cell phone data to cell service
providers by signing a contract with them for their services, thus risking
that the cell service providers will disclose the information to the
government without their express knowledge or approval. 0 8 While
Justice Sotomayor's consenting opinion in Jones suggests the era of the
applicability of the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine has passed, until this
view is endorsed by the majority of the Supreme Court, the Third Party
Disclosure Doctrine is still good law.30 9 Moreover, the information
obtained via cell tower dumps involves cell phone information
"communicated for the purpose of making and receiving calls in the
ordinary course of the provision of cellular phone service. 310 Cell phone
users understand that when they are outside the network of their service
provider, their cell phone does not work.3 11 Therefore, cell phone users
know that when they make or receive calls, their cell phones transmit
signals to the nearest cell tower, and as a result, to their communications
service providers.31 2 One court compared cell phone use to providing a
telephone operator with the phone number you want dialed because once
a person tells the operator the phone number they want dialed, the phone
314
3 13
number is no longer confidential. Analogous to Smith v. Maryland,
a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers dialed on a home phone, and therefore, it follows that
a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
numbers dialed on a cell phone.31 5
307.
308.
numbers
309.

Nakashima, supranote 9, at A9.
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (extending Third Party Disclosure Doctrine to telephone
dialed); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (establishing the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see

also Orin Kerr, Third Circuit on the Mosaic Theory and Smith v. Maryland, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/30/third-

circuit-on-the-mosaic-theory-and-smith-v-maryland.
310.
311.

United States v. Caraballo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 341, 359-60 (D. Vt. 2013).
In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013);

United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012).
312.

In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 146; see Madison, 2012

WL 3095357, at *8.
313. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012); Crusco, supranote 13, at 8.
314. 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
details of the Smith v. Maryland case).
315. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744-45; see also Orin Kerr, Third Circuit Rules that MagistrateJudges
Have Discretion to Reject non-WarrantCourt Order Applications and Require Search Warrants to
Obtain Historical Cell-Site Records, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:23 PM),

http://volokh.com/2010/09/08/third-circuit-rules-that-magistrate-judges-have-discretion-to-rejectcourt-order-application-and-require-search-warrants-to-obtain-historical-cell-site-records
(explaining how the pen registers used in Smith provided an exact location, yet the Court found the
location where the call originated was immaterial, whereas in cell tower dump cases, the location of
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C. The Mosaic Theory Should Not be Applied to Cell Tower Dumps
Cell tower dumps should not be subject to the Mosaic Theory
because they provide very limited information about a person.3 6 The
Mosaic Theory posits that a collection of technological surveillance data
from a variety of sources paints a vivid and deeply personal portrait of
an individual. 1 7 While the Mosaic Theory can offer greater protection
than the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine, "it does not offer courts or law
enforcement authorities an objective means by which to 3distinguish
18
conduct that amounts to a search from conduct that does not.
While each individual piece of technological surveillance data does
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, when combined and looked
at in its totality, it is evident that an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is violated. 319 Thus, the totality of the evidence is a
Fourth Amendment search.32 ° Since only minimal constitutional
protection is applied when location data facilitates the discovery of
information that already enjoys constitutional protection, the location
data becomes part of the mosaic.32 ' Cell tower dumps are not afforded
constitutional protection because they do not constitute a search
protected by the Fourth Amendment; thus, they are not part of the

where the call originated appears to be the entire crux of the issue).
316. Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying the
Mosaic Theory to GPS tracking because it provides an intimate portrait of an individual's life), with
In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that cell tower dumps do
not allow for the possibility of widespread tracking). Since GPS tracking provides a more vivid
picture of a person's life than cell tower dumps, the Mosaic Theory is applicable to GPS tracking
and not to cell tower dumps. In re United States, 42 F. Supp. 3d, at 515-16; Maynard, 615 F.3d. at
561-62.
317. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,concurring)
(applying the Mosaic Theory to GPS tracking and stating that "GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familiar, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations").
318. Bernick, supra note 258, at 5-6 (arguing the Third Party Disclosure Doctrine provides
clarity for law enforcement and courts).
319. Ken Strutin, Mosaic Theory: A New Perspectivefor Human Privacy, 250 N.Y. L.J. 5, 7
(2013).
320. Kerr, supra note 150, at 320. Under this approach:
The mosaic theory requires the courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search doctrine to
government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated steps. Instead of asking
if a particular act is a search, the mosaic theory asks whether a series of acts that are not
searches in isolation amount to a search when considered as a group.
Id.
321. Bellovin et al., supranote 106, at 583.
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mosaic.322 The Mosaic Theory has also been described as "[d]isparate
items of information [that], though individually of limited or no utility to
their possessor, can take on
added significance when combined with
323
other items of information."
However, this is not applicable to the information obtained via cell
tower dumps because that information is extremely limited.324 Justice
Sotomayor suggested that the Mosaic Theory should be applied when
the government learns details about a person's personal life "more or
less at will.

' 325

However, cell tower dumps only provide a list of phone

numbers, not the record of a person's precise movements and intimate
reflection of an individual's personal life that is created by GPS data.326
Cell tower dumps only provide a list of phone numbers that were in the
vicinity of the cell tower on the date and time in question.32 7 Not only is
this very limited information, but it is also extremely valuable to law
enforcement.3 28 Cell tower dumps also differ from the more typical cases
where the Mosaic Theory is applied, such as GPS tracking cases,
because law enforcement is not getting exact and precise information.329
In United States v. Maynard,33 ° the Majority argued that prolonged
331
surveillance reveals greater detail about a person's private life.
However, when law enforcement utilizes cell tower dumps, it is only
requesting periods of time up to two hours.332 Justice Sotomayor argued
in her concurring opinion in Jones that the Mosaic Theory becomes
applicable in the digital age because, with advances in technology, law
enforcement has greater access to an entire picture of a person's life
without restriction.333 While that may be true for forms of technology
like GPS tracking, that is not the case for cell tower dumps because of

322.

See supra Part IV.A-B.

323. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005); Kerr, supra note 150, at 320.
324. Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.
325. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
326. Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.
327. Id.
328.

329.
615 F.3d
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part [V.A.

See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United States v. Maynard,
544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 2009).
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Maynard, 615 F.3d. at 562; Kerr, supra note 150, at 326.
Nakashima, supranote 9.
Jones, 132 S. Ct.at 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the limited information law enforcement actually obtains. 334 Justice Alito
suggested that the Mosaic Theory is applicable when law enforcement
gathers and analyzes evidence in a way that would surprise members of
society.335 It is not a surprise to any member in today's society that cell
service providers collect the outgoing and incoming call information of
cell phone users, because people today understand that this is
the ordinary course of business for cell service providers.3 36 Further,
when law enforcement uses GPS tracking, or even real-time cell-site
location data, it has a particular target.3 37 But, it does not have a
particular person or cell phone number that it is targeting when it does a
cell tower dump; rather, law enforcement uses cell tower dumps at the
early stages of an investigation to find suspects and get the necessary
information to establish probable cause. 338 Thus, using all the available
investigative tools to create the portrait of a person or situation is good
investigative work by law enforcement, not a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.339
V.

CONCLUSION

Cell tower dumps do not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment because they do not violate a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 340 They reveal such a limited amount of
information about an individual that they should not be subject to the
higher standard of probable cause; rather, the specific and articulable
facts standard is sufficient.341 When law enforcement uses cell tower
dumps, it is not singling out a specific phone number that they want
information about.34 2 Instead, law enforcement is looking at records of

334. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that all law enforcement really gets from cell
tower dumps is a list of outgoing and incoming phone calls to that particular cell tower).
335. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 105
(statement of Mark Eckenweiler); Kerr, supra note 150, at 330.
336. See supra Part IV.B.
337. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948 (explaining that police targeted Jones because he was
suspected of being a drug dealer); supranote 21.
338. ECPA Hearing, supra note 155, at 24 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi); Crusco, supra
note 13, at 5.
339. ECPA Hearing,supranote 155, at 26-27 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
340. See supra Part IV.B.
341. See supra Part III.B-C.
342. Crusco, supra note 13, at 5.
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all incoming and outgoing phone calls that were bounced off a particular
cell tower on a given date and time.3 43 Since cell phone users voluntarily
disclose their location information to cell service providers, they assume
the risk that their cell service provider will convey this information to a
third party. 344 The information obtained from cell tower dumps are the
business records of the cell service providers kept in the ordinary course
of business. 345 This is understood by cell phone users because there is
widespread public knowledge of ability and practice of cell phone
service providers to track customers' locations.346 Finally, the Mosaic
Theory is not applicable because the information obtained via cell tower
dumps does not create a vivid portrait about an individual's personal
life-all cell tower dumps provide is a list of incoming and outgoing
calls that were facilitated by a specific cell tower.347 This does very little
to provide law enforcement with more than a picture of the cell phone
not give a
users in the vicinity of the cell tower, and it certainly does
348
vivid portrait of one particular cell phone user on that list.
Essentially, cell tower dumps only provide law enforcement with a
list of cell phone numbers that were being used at a particular time, on a
particular date, in a given location. 349 From there, law enforcement must
do additional work to track down leads to establish probable cause.35 °
The information obtained from cell tower dumps is a crucial building
block of investigations, and to require a showing of a higher standard to
obtain such information would severely hinder the efficiency of law
enforcement and could even have deadly consequences in solving
crimes. 351 The Supreme Court needs to establish a bright line rule
providing that in order for the government to obtain information via cell
tower dumps, it must show specific and articulable facts.352 This would

343. See supra Part 1V.A.
344. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see supra notes 298-303 and
accompanying text (comparing cell tower dumps and E-ZPass records).
345. United States v. Caraballo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 341, 259-60 (D. Vt. 2013).
346. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Association, 979 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146-47 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
347. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Crusco,
supranote 13, at 5.
348. Crusco, supranote 13, at 5.
349. Id.
350. ECPA Hearing,supra note 155, at 26 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
351. Id. at 28 (statement of Peter A. Modafferi).
352.

See supra Part IV.A.
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protect the privacy interests of individuals, while still allowing law
enforcement to use all the investigatory tools at their disposal to
efficiently and effectively carry out their investigations. 5 3
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See supra Part 1V.A.
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